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The Legality of US. Strikes
Under International Law
By Daniel H: Joyner
Ss -the United States
continues the mili-
,Itary phase of the
recently proclaimed "war on ter-
rorisir," attention has turned,
among international law scholars,
to the legality of U.S. strikes within
the territory of countries that the
U.S. claims harbor or aid terrorist
groups.
And while international law
concerns routinely take a back seat
in the minds of policy and law
makers to matters of perceived
policy imperative, when the dust
from the current campaign
inevitably clears, we will be forced
to live with the decisions we make
now, and with their precedential
effect on international relaions,
which is likely to be significant.
Thus, a moment's reflection upon
the degree to which our current
and prospective actions are in har-
mony with established principles
of international law is warranted.
The Right to
Self-Defense
The U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations, John Nqegropqnte,
recently.- delivered, h -letter to the
U.N. Security Couicil in- which
was stated the official U.S. Position
,that military strikes thus far exe-
cuted in Afghanistan have been
carried out in reliance on the self.
defense article of the U.N. Charter.
The letter stated further that "[wie
may find that our self-defense
requires further actions with
respect to other organizations and
other states,"1 though it did not
specify which states are being con-
sidered as potential targets.
The substantive law for examin-
ing any international act of force
by states that are members of the
United Nations can be found in
various provisions contained in the
United Nations Charter. The most
comprehensive of these provisions
can be found in Article 2(4) of the
Charter which states "[aill
Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the
threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in
any manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
This provision has- cme'to be
underst6od as a broad and'binding
nonintervention norm and has gen-
erally been interpreted by inier-a-
tionar legal scholars -to provide .a
blanket prqhibition on international
acts of force by members of the
United Nations (incdding, notably,
the United States and the United
Kingdom) that violate, directly or
indirectly, the-territory or internal
sovereignty of another state.
However, the Charter does pro-
vide, in Article 51 and Chapter VII,
limited exceptions to this blanket
prohibition. These exceptions are
to be found in cases of legitimate
self-defense and authorization of
force by the U.N. Security Council.
The right of self-defense under
the Charter authorizes defensive
action by the victim state "if an
armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations."
2
The words "if an armed attack
occurs" have traditionally been
interpreted to mean that defensive
action can only be taken after a
state has actually been attacked by
another state. Thus, textually, there
is little support for a right of pre-
emptive or anticipatory self-




At this point, an examination of
the facts is necessary. In this case,
there has undeniably been a seri-
ous violation of the territorial
integrity of the United States from
a foreign source constituting an
armed attack on U.S. soil. This
prompts many, including many in
positions of policymaking, to feel
that international use of force by
the United States directed at a vari-
ety of terrorist organizations with-
in a variety of foreign states with
varying degrees of connection to
the Sept. 11 attacks is completely
justifiable on self-defense grounds.
It is at this juncture, however,
tbat the facts of the current case
begin to pose analytical problems
for examining the legality of cur-
rent and future U.S. military strikes
under international law. The tradi-
tional paradigm for invocation of
the self-defense clause of the U.N.
Charter has, of course, been a
response to an attack on the victim
state traceable to a foreign nation
against whom the victim state now
plans to retaliate for the purpose of
repulsing the aggression and ceas-
ing its further continuance. The
notable difference in the pi sent
case, of course, is that the links to
state sponsorship of the terrorists
who carried out the Sept. 11 attacks
are more tenuous and the support
itself (though further investigation
may reveal otherwise) seems at this
point to have been limited to
knowledgeable failure to expel ter-
rorist cells from within state bor-
ders on one end of the spectrum
and to active financial backing and
sympathy on the other end.
These less than direct contacts
with the actual prosecution of the
Sept. 11 attacks against the United
States make the case for a broad
war against state aiders and abet-
tors of terrorism a novel proposi-
tion, and one the legality of which
is, quite frankly, an arguable ques-
tion under a strict textual reading
of the self-defense provision of the
U.N. Charter, and arguments in
support of the legality of such a
campaign, it must be said, grow
less tenable as the links between a
state and the terrorist cells actually
involved in the acts of terrorism
become more distant.
As the facts are currently under-
stood, and without the benefit of
full disclosure of evidence the
United States and its allies have
thus far gathered, it seems that a
compelling case has been made
that the Al Qaeda organization,
headed by Osama bin Laden, was
materially connected to the acts of
terrorism on U.S. soil on Sept. 11. It
has also been established that not
only have bin Laden and Al Qaeda
been given sanctuary in
Afghanistan in full knowledge of
the general nature of their terrorist
activities (as witnessed by the ras)h
of training camps across the coun-
try, a knowledge of the existence
and purpose of which cannot real-
istically be disavowed by the
Taliban leadership), but there are
further reports of evidence that Al
Qaeda has enjoyed financial and
other support, through both direct
and indirect means, from the
Taliban government.
Under these facts, much of the
current U.S. led military campaign
against Al Qaeda and other targets
located within Afghanistan is
arguably justifiable and rests upon
a reasonably sound international
law foundation. Assuming that
material facts are verifiable, such a
legal justification would proceed as
follows: attacks on U.S. soil took
place; Al Qaeda was material in
planning and carrying out the
attacks; the Taliban government
both actively and passively sup-
ported Al Qaeda through harbor-
ing Al Qaeda in Afghan territory
and otherwise facilitating their
operations.3 These facts, coupled
with later statements by Taliban
officials endorsing the Sept. 11
actions,4 arguably give rise to a
greater degree of state liability
under international law for acts
committed by non-state actors than
would have arisen had Al Qaeda
simply been based in Afghanistan
and not enjoyed the de facto gov-
ernment's substantive support and
open approbation. 5
In the opinion of the present
author, a strong argument can be
made that due to the significant
level of support given Al Qaeda by
the Taliban, Afghanistan's ruling
regime rendered itself legally sus-
ceptible to resulting military meas-
ures taken by the United States in
its territory, at least to the degree
that those measures expressly tar-




Thus far in the war on terrorism,
the United States is on relatively
stable legal ground.7 However, a
wider war on terrorism, which
statements of high-ranking U.S.
officials would seem to indicate is
in its formative stages in U.S. poli-
cymaking circles, presents more
significant analytical problems.
The parameters of such a wider
and prolonged war hay not been
made entirely clear, but as the
scope of the campaign enlarges
both to include bringing to justice
all terrorist cells affiliated with Al
Qaeda, be they in whatever nation
they might, and even further to
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confront and subdue other terrorist
groups throughout the Middle East
and elsewhere who have little or no
direct connection to the Sept. 11
attacks, the U.S. and its allies are
likely to find both international
political support for their anti-ter-
ror coalition waning and interna-
tional legal criticism intensifying.
However, the practice of states
in the area of international use of
force has established considerable
precedent for expanding the recog
nized scope of the right of sclf-
defense under the U.N. Charter ,0;
include acts of force by a state
which has not yet been attacked
but which, upon compelling evi-
dence, believes that an attack by
another state is imminent.
Examples of such practice include
Israel's 1981 bombing of a nuclear
reactor in Iraq, which Israel
claimed was justified as anticipato-
ry self-defense because the reactor
was to be used to manufacture
nuclear weapons for use against
Israel (though the Israeli attack was
later censured by the Security
Council as premature in light of the
fact that the reactor had not yet
come on line, and thus was not a
potential threat at the time it was
attacked). The United States has
also invoked the doctrine of antici-
patory self-defense to justify its
actions in the past, most relevantly
in the cases of the 1986 bombing of
Libya, which the United States
claimed was a preemptive strike on
the capabilities of state-sponsored
terrorists who had carried out a
bomb attack on U.S. soldiers at a
nightclub in Berlin, and the 1998
missile attacks in Afghanistan and
Sudan following the bombings of
U.S. embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya.
As previously noted, the United
States and its allies are dealing with
a largely re-volutionary paradigm
of armed aggression and the legali-
ty of responses thereto. The magni-
tude of the terrorist attacks on the
United States and the resulting loss
of life and collateral effects on the
nation have been unprecedented.
So too is the task of uncovering the
identities of the attackers and their
web of support and funding, some
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of which is bound to be traceable to
individuals or agencies with state
attributes. And while, traditionally,
acts of pure reprisal by a state
which has been the victim of a ter-
rorist attack, against another state
due to the terrorists' origin therein
have not been viewed as permissi-
ble under international law, never
has there been a terrorist attack the
character of which has been so
comparable to a state-sponsored
act of war in its destructive
impact.8
Furthermore, the continued
statements of such terrorist groups,
notably from the Al Qaeda organi-
zation, but also from other funda-
mentalist groups not directly asso-
ciated with bin Laden, make clear
that the Sept. 11 attacks were not
isolated events and that a contin-
ued and very real threat from these
organizations yet exists, making
legitimate desires by the United
States, which has been explicitly
mentioned in these threats and per-
haps other potential target states,
to pursue preemptive action
against the terrorist groups them-
selves and states without whose
support such future attacks would
be impossible.9
This "new breed" of terrorists,
whose force capability has been
prover to be on par with direct
state action, may indeed require a
progression in the law of interna-
tional use of force in order to clari-
fy the doctrine of self-defense to
unambiguously include within its
legitimizing ambit preemptive acts
of force against terrorist organiza-
tions within other states.
However, to justify violations of
the territorial sovereignty of for-














to be requiredelements is likely




The first is direct state sponsor-
ship. It is probable that a finding of
knowledgeable failure by a state to
expel terrorist groups from its bor-
ders will not be sufficient to justify
the invocation of the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense in the
forceful intervention by the United
States and/or its allies into the ter-
ritory of the target state. Such a
defense, if accepted by the interna-
tional community, would cast far
too wide a net over potential candi-
dates for U.S. intervention, and
would include many states in the
Middle East and elsewhere who
desire to aid in a global campaign
against terrorism, but who are
unable to crack down seriously on
known terrorist organizations in
their countries because they lack
the enforcement capabilities to
carry out such a broad domestic
police action, which if attempted
would inevitably provoke such
groups to retaliate, thus escalating
conflict in the region and possibly
destabilizing legitimate and rela-
tively progressive moderate gov-
ernments.
Indeed, states like Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, while cognizant of
the existence of terrorist cells with-
in their boundaries cannot realisti-
cally be expected to root out all
such groups, even if put under con-
siderable diplomatic and economic
pressure by the United States and
the international community. An
analogy to organized crime syndi-
cates in U.S. cities during the 1920s
seems apt, but without the possibil-
ity of rescue by in this case nonex-
istent super-national regulators.
Some, including former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, believe
the United States should fill such a
role and provide assurances of
added security to bolster domestic
crackdown efforts.10 This seems,
however, to be a formula for exces-
sive U.S. force dilution around the
world unparalleled in other pro-
posals put forward thus far. In the
present author's opinion, it is
entirely unrealistic, and would
present serious national sovereign-
ty and military mission ccncerns,
for the United States to be put in a
position of providing substantial
domestic policing support for
nations attempting to crack down
on terrorist elements within their
borders.11
Thus, a standard of knowledge-
able failure to expel would leave to
the United States and its allies a
great deal of discretion regarding
which states are worthy of being
the targets of anti-terrorism outside
intervention, and on what scale.
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As previously noted, the United
States and its allies are dealing
with a largely revolutionary para-
digm of armed aggression and the
legality of responses thereto.
While this may be palatable to
those who trust the judgement of
the great western powers in choos-
ing where and when to use force,
the purpose of having a body of
international law covering the area
of international use of force (which
was a primary goal of the United
Nations Charter) has always been
tc assure that the acts of every indi-
vidual state will be measured by
the same standard without regard
to economic status or military
might. Such a non-limiting stan-
dard would seriously weaken the
restrictions set forth in Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter and would
establish a dangerous precedent
upon which other states could jus-
tify interventions based on the fact
alone of a target state's failure to
quell known terrorist movements
within its borders.
However, as the famed
Nicaragua decision of the
International Court of Justice
makes clear, the liability of a state
may be established for interven-
tions into the territory of another
state conducted by non-state
agents but with state support.1
2
Thus, if a clear money trail could be
established, linking a state govern-
ment to willful or knowledgeable
funding of the relevant terrorist
activities, this fact would present a
strong argument that the funding
state has materially participated in
the acts themselves and thus that
invasions of their territory for the
purpose of killing or apprehending
the terrorists would be defensible




The second element the presence
of which will likely be required is
compelling evidence of imminent
future attacks by the specific terror-
ist groups to be targeted.
Interventions into the territory of
other states cannot be justified on
purely punitive or retaliatory
grounds. As the name implies,
anticipatory self-defense will only
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be invocable upon a finding of
clear evidence fitat an attack on the
state or states wishing to use force
under that doctrine is imminent.
This evidence need not necessarily
be shared with all who wish access
to it, but disclosure to responsible,
friendly foreign governments will
be useful not only in garnering
increased international support for
the proposed intervention, but also
in allowing objective scrutiny of
the *idence, which will in turn aid
the intervening state in its later
claims of anticipatory self defense
against counterclaims of post-hoc
manufacture of incriminating evi-
dence to justify strikes.
Proportionality
The final element of any asser-
tion of self-defense is proportional-
ity. Responses to aggression must
not be significantly disproportion-
ate to the underlying aggressive
actions themselves. This is most
importantly gauged by the degree
to which civilian property is inci-
dentally destroyed and lives are
lost in excess of a reasonable calcu-
lus based on the gravity of the
attacks to which such force is in
response. In the case of the recent
attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C., that standard
will likely leave considerable lee-
way for U.S. and allied response,
due to the magnitude of the
destruction and number of lives
lost, which should have a material
bearing on the calculus of threat
which such actions seek to pre-
empt. However, as the anti-terror
campaign progresses, the United
States will need to be mindful of
this standard both in its selection of
targets, including number and
character of target states, and in its
use of ordnance, lest the response
to the attacks on U.S. soil and the
continued threats to U.S. interests
of which those attacks are indica-
tive be deemed to have exceeded
its concededly broad mandate.
Conclusion
If all three of the above elements
are not present, the doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense will likely
fail as a justifying principle, and
liability under international law for
non-compliant international uses
of force by United Nations mem-
bers will likely result, if those
actions are not taken with the legit-
imizing sanction of the U.N.
Security Council through resolu-
tion grounded in Article VII of the
U.N. Charter. This fact could very
likely limit the currently envi-
sioned U.S.-led campaign against
terror in its selection of targets and
in its duration, which will be
unwelcome restrictions to policy
makers in Washington and other
capitals - but one must consider
the alternative.
Unrestrained international uses
of force and weak international law
constraints have brought about
untold suffering over the centuries,
as the sole discretion regarding
whether or not military operations
against a foreign nation were justi-
fiable, if a part of strategic calculus
at all, has largely been left to the
powerful states who had the
resources necessary for such cam-
paigns. On some occasions, outside
evaluation of the merits of such
decisions yields strong internation-
al support for the resulting inter-
vening actions, as in the present
case. However, at the current stage
in the evolution of international
law, in which international norms
are often enforced only through
voluntary coalitions of powerful
states, if those same states do not
voluntarily regulate themselves
and bring their own behavior into
compliance with international law
regarding legitimate uses of force,
their subsequent attempts to regu-
late the behavior of less well mean-
in, states by reference to the same
legal principles will surely be
severely compromised.
No one is benefited from an
international system in which
hypocrisy of the powerful reigns,
and especially not in an area of
international interaction as vital as
communal regulation of interna-
tional use of force. Therefore, the
great nations of the world, who are
now engaged in a cause the worthi-
ness of which few doubt, must tem-
per their justified outrage with
respect for international law and
work within its limiting, but neces-
sary, confines as an investment in
their own security and protection
from those states who will in the
future be mindful of precedents set
now, and who may seek to engage
in regrettable acts against which
the world will be able to assert only
increasingly hollow claims of
affronted principle. 0
Daniel H. Joyner is
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